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DEBILITATING SOUTHEASTERN COMMUNITY COLLEGE V. DAVIS:
ACHIEVING THE PROMISE OF DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS
Leslie Francis *
ABSTRACT
Disability civil rights law today continues to be shaped by troubling precedent created in
initial decisions of the Supreme Court under the Rehabilitation Act. This article explores the first
of these decisions, Southeastern Community College v. Davis, demonstrates Davis’ continuing
impact, and analyzes how this impact may be addressed.
Davis was a suit brought by a hearing-impaired student who had been refused
accommodations and denied admission to the College’s nursing program. Critical litigation
decisions on behalf of Davis at the trial court did not contest the College’s failure to provide
accommodations that are common today, such as sign interpretation, or the College’s assessment
that Davis could not function adequately with such accommodations. The Court thus assumed as
given the College's refusal to provide Davis with accommodations and supposed that Davis
could not participate safely in the clinical portion of the nursing program. The Court then
concluded that her participation would require fundamental alterations in the nursing program
that could not be justified as reasonable modifications.
This article contends that the Davis decision perpetuated a fundamental confusion between
accommodations—adjustments or aids needed for an individual to perform capably—and
modifications—changes in existing programs, policies, or structures. Further, confusing
accommodations and modifications risks construing individuals as either demanding unjustified
modifications in policies or requesting special accommodations that are personal privileges for
themselves. Presenting evidence drawn from the analysis of subsequent reported district court
and appellate court cases citing or relying on cases citing Davis, the article then shows how these
confusions persist nearly thirty years after the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). The result is that many courts fail to assess actual capabilities of people with disabilities.
*
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Instead, courts reject claims for accommodations as requests for unjustified modifications by
people who are otherwise unqualified for jobs, public services, or public activities in which they
seek to participate.
INTRODUCTION
Decided in 1979, Southeastern Community College v. Davis 1 was the first major case under
the Rehabilitation Act (Rehab Act) to come before the U.S. Supreme Court. Litigation choices
made in Davis about the issues to contest and the evidence to present, although perhaps not
surprising for such a novel case, have resulted in devastating precedent that continues to shape
Rehab Act and ADA law. This article unearths the significance of these litigation choices and
demonstrates their continuing effects. It reveals how Davis rested on two fundamental and
interrelated confusions, between accommodations and modifications and between affirmative
relief and affirmative action. Debilitating Davis by disentangling these confusions brings needed
clarity to the understanding of disability civil rights. In challenging the legacy of Davis, this
article also complements my earlier work with the late Anita Silvers on the problematic legacy of
a second formative Rehab Act decision, Alexander v. Choate. 2
On the distinction elaborated in this article, accommodations are adjustments or aids needed
for an individual to perform capably, whereas modifications are changes to existing programs,
policies, or structures. Accommodations are particularized and specific to the individuals
needing them. Accommodations are thus appropriate when an individual who functions
differently can perform, participate, or enjoy a benefit that would not be available without the
accommodation. Modifications change constructed or policy environments that exclude people
with disabilities. In contrast to accommodations, modifications are thus appropriate when
redesign can foster more general inclusion of people with disabilities to important opportunities.
For example, curb cuts allow people to move through urban surroundings, elevators enable
people to reach upper floors of buildings, flextime work schedules adjust to different rhythms of
daily life, and home and community-based service programs provide people with services in
intimate rather than institutional settings. Frequently, modifications also benefit other members
of the public; for example, curb cuts and ramps are used by bicyclists, people pushing strollers,
or people with roller bag suitcases.
When sought by people with disabilities, both accommodations and modifications may
generate critique. For accommodations, which are individualized, the critique is special
privileging: that someone who receives an accommodation gets a break or an advantage that
others do not or imposes unfair burdens or risks on others who do not receive the
accommodation. For purposes of disability anti-discrimination law, possible responses to this
critique are that an accommodation is reasonable because it allows qualified individuals to
perform or participate in ways that work for them and that imposition of undue hardship on
others sets outside limits on the duty to accommodate. For modifications, which are general
changes that may apply to everyone, the critique is that they are unreasonable, too expensive, or
1

Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
Leslie P. Francis & Anita Silvers, Debilitating Alexander v. Choate: “Meaningful Access” to Health
Care for People with Disabilities, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 447 (2008).
2
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too difficult. For purposes of disability anti-discrimination law, possible responses take the form
of outside limits. For example, program changes may not be required if they are fundamental
alterations and building designs need not incorporate features that cannot readily be achieved.
Confusing accommodations and modifications, however, risks creating problematic
perceptions of unfairness. Accommodations misperceived as modifications open the possible
perception that the rules are being changed to benefit individuals in ways that cannot be justified.
Modifications misperceived as accommodations open the possible perception that claimants are
expecting the rules to be individually tailored to personal needs in ways that are unfair to others.
This confusion between accommodations and modifications is just what happened in Davis and
what continues to affect anti-discrimination law today, as described later in this article. 3 The
result has been continuing failure on the part of some courts to assess actual capabilities of
people with disabilities. Instead, courts reject their claims as requests for unjustified
modifications by people who are otherwise unqualified for the jobs, public services, or public
activities in which they seek to participate. 4
This article begins by exploring how the Court’s reasoning in Davis rests on a basic
confusion between accommodations—adjustments or aids needed for an individual to perform
capably—and modifications: changes in existing programs, policies, or structures. The article
then demonstrates how this confusion led the Court to misconstrue what should have been
analyzed as an accommodation request as a modification that could be condemned as
“affirmative action” in the form of unwarranted special privileging. Presenting evidence drawn
from the analysis of reported district court and appellate court cases citing Davis, or relying on
cases citing Davis, the article then provides examples of the continuing impact of the confusion
between modifications and accommodations to this day. Disentangling the legacy of Davis, I
conclude below, addresses misperceptions that have led to criticisms of disability civil rights as a
form of unfair privileging.
I.

ACCOMMODATIONS AND MODIFICATION UNDER THE REHAB ACT

The Rehab Act of 1973 created a statutory basis for the Rehabilitation Services
Administration and provided support for a variety of federal programs to expand opportunities
and rehabilitation services for people with disabilities. 5 One major goal of the Rehab Act was to
prohibit disability discrimination associated with federal funding. Section 504 of the Act
provided: “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her
or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance…” 6 This
statutory anti-discrimination requirement was triggered by receipt of federal funding. 7 Thus
under §504, a single non-discrimination standard governed employment, public services, and

3
4
5
6
7

See infra PART V.
Id.
Public Law 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (Sept. 26, 1973), § 2.
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504(a), amended by P.L. 114-95 (Dec. 10, 2015).
Id.
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public accommodations, so long as these were in programs or activities that received federal
funding.
The regulations implementing § 504, issued in 1977, covered the primary areas in which
federal funding was received, including employment and education. 8 These regulations
distinguished accommodations from modifications and applied this distinction in a nuanced way
to different funding areas. 9
For employment by recipients of federal funds, the regulations used the language of
accommodation and required “reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified applicant or employee unless the recipient can demonstrate
that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship…” 10 For postsecondary educational
programs receiving federal funding, which could be in the form of either government-provided
services (public services) or services open to the general public in interstate commerce (public
accommodations), “modifications” was the primary term employed. 11 Programs were required to
modify academic requirements as necessary “to ensure that such requirements do not
discriminate or have the effect of discriminating, on the basis of handicap, against a qualified
handicapped applicant or student.” 12 Requirements “essential” to the program, however, did not
require modification. 13 Under the regulations, non-discrimination in educational programs also
required accommodations in the form of auxiliary aids and services: “such steps as are necessary
to ensure that no handicapped student is denied the benefits of, excluded from participation in, or
otherwise subjected to discrimination …because of the absence of educational auxiliary aids for
students with impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills.” 14 These aids specifically included
interpreters and other methods of making oral materials available to students with hearing
impairments. 15 Unlike with employment, the regulations contained no provision for
consideration of expense as a defense to the requirement of these auxiliary aids. 16
II.

SOUTHEASTERN COMMUNITY COLLEGE V. DAVIS: THE PROBLEMS BEGIN

This article argues that Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 17 the seminal case
interpreting § 504, introduced the confusion between accommodation and modification in a
particularly damaging way. Although Davis has shaped disability anti-discrimination law ever
since it was decided, its litigation background and context have been insufficiently understood by

8

See infra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
Id.
10
45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1977). Accommodations could include acquisition or modification of equipment
or devices and the provision of readers or interpreters. 45 C.F.R. §84.12(b) (1977).
11
45 C.F.R. §84.44(a) (1977).
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
45 C.F.R. §84.44(d)(1) (1977).
15
45 C.F.R. §84.44(d)(2) (1977).
16
Id.
17
Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
9
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later courts or commentators. 18 Litigation choices made at the trial court level in Davis brought
the confusions into play, perhaps understandably because the regulations implementing § 504
had not been issued when Davis went to trial. 19 When attorneys for the National Association for
the Deaf joined the case at the appellate level, they recognized the problem, but it was too late to
salvage the situation. 20
Davis was a suit brought under the Rehab Act by a hearing-impaired licensed practical nurse
who had been denied admission to Southeastern’s nursing associate degree program. 21 As
litigated at the trial court, the case was decided only on a legal question about how Davis’
admission qualifications were to be assessed. 22 Davis contended that Southeastern should assess
her academic qualifications for participation in the program apart from her disability. 23
Southeastern contended that the admission decision should be based on whether she could
perform in the program in spite of her disability. 24 Focusing solely on this legal argument about
how her qualifications should be assessed, Davis introduced no evidence about her actual
performance capabilities with or without auxiliary aids, such as sign interpretation or speakers
facing her so she could lip-read. 25 Nor did she introduce evidence of any modifications in the
program that might be necessary for her to participate, if she were provided with these aids. 26
This litigation choice may have seemed reasonable at the time, as Davis had achieved academic
success in Southeastern’s year-long preparatory program for the associate degree and had been
led to believe success in this program would suffice for admission to the associate degree
program. 27 Before admission to the preparatory program, she had been evaluated as physically
able to undertake the professional nursing program and advised that her progress to the associate
degree program would be based on her academic evaluation at the end of the preparatory year. 28
Despite her satisfactory academic performance, Southeastern denied her admission to the
associate degree program on the basis that her hearing impairment would make her unable to
participate safely in the clinical portion of the program. 29 Davis then contended she had been
erroneously denied admission based solely on her disability. 30
18
One exception is Armen H. Merjian, Bad Decisions Make Bad Decisions: Davis, Arline, and Improper
Application of the Undue Financial Burden Defense Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (1999). Merjian’s article is a careful reconstruction of the mistakes in Davis
that led to the Court's comment about hypothetical possibilities for aids that would not impose “undue financial and
administrative burdens upon a State,” Se. Cmty. Coll., 442 U.S. at 413. But Merjian characterized Davis’ case as “a
poor ‘test case for advocates seeking an expansive reading of the Act,” without recognizing the problematic
litigation choices discussed here. Merijian at 125.
19
See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
20
Disability Rights Movement’s Legislative Impact Sprang from On-Campus Activism, ABA JOURNAL,
(Jan. 2018), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/disability_rights_campus_activism_legislation/P2.
21
Davis v. Se. Cmty. Coll., 424 F. Supp. 1341, 1344 (E.D.N.C. 1976).
22
Id.
23
Id. at 1345.
24
Br. for Resp’t, Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, No. 78-711, 1979 WL 213503 (U.S.) (Appellate Br.), at *5-6.
25
Davis, 424 F. Supp. at 1342.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Br. for Resp’t, Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, No. 78-711, 1979 WL 213503 (U.S.) (Appellate Br.), at *5.
29
Br. for Resp’t, 1979 WL 19920 at *12.
30
Davis, 424 F. Supp. at 1343.
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The trial court rejected Davis’ legal argument, concluding that “[o]therwise qualified ... can
only be read to mean otherwise able to function sufficiently in the position sought in spite of the
handicap, if proper training and facilities are suitable and available.” 31 Further, because Davis
had not put on relevant evidence, the court credited the testimony of the College that it could not
provide the relevant auxiliary aids and that Davis could not participate safely in the program’s
required clinical training. 32 Importantly, these conclusions were based only on the uncontested
evidence of the College 33 but they were to prove critical as the case developed further.
The Fourth Circuit reversed the trial court on the “rather narrow” legal basis that § 504
prohibited the College from taking disability into account in the admission decision. 34 By the
time Davis reached the Fourth Circuit on appeal, however, the regulations interpreting § 504 of
the Rehab Act had finally been issued. 35 In light of the regulations, the appellate court also
opined, in language conflating accommodations and modifications, that “it would be appropriate,
as guidance for the court below, to briefly discuss plaintiff's claim that the district court also
erred by failing to consider that the College could be required to modify the nursing program to
accommodate the plaintiff and her hearing disability.” 36 In assessing the College’s position that
Davis could not participate in the clinical program, the district court on remand was to give
adequate attention to the regulatory requirement that auxiliary aids should be provided “even
when such modifications become expensive.” 37 Here, too, the appellate court did not distinguish
a request for auxiliary aids and services, such as sign interpretation, from a modification in the
nursing program curriculum, such as exemption from certain clinical requirements. The proper
guidance under the regulations, however, would have required the College first to consider any
requests for auxiliary aids and services and then to analyze what program modifications Davis
would have required with reasonable accommodations to participate in the program and receive
its benefits. 38 On this two-step analysis, answering the first question would have required
considering whether her accommodation requests were reasonable, and answering the second
would have required considering whether any program modifications she would have needed
with reasonable accommodations were fundamental alterations.
As Davis reached the Supreme Court, the College framed the relevant legal issues exactly in
line with the trial judge’s ruling:
1. Whether Section 504 of this Act precludes a public college from basing a
denial of admission to the college’s Associate Degree Nursing Program solely
31

Id. at 1345.
Id. at 1345-46.
33
Id. at 1346.
34
Davis v. Se. Cmty. Coll., 574 F.2d 1158, 1160 (4th Cir. 1978).
35
Id. at 1161. Issuance of the regulations implementing § 504 had been significantly delayed and the
delays occasioned increasing protests. The regulations were finally issued in 1977 after demonstrations and sit-ins
across the country, including a month-long sit-in in a federal building in San Francisco. See 504 Sit-in 20th
Anniversary, DREDF, https://dredf.org/504-sit-in-20th-anniversary/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2019).
36
574 F.2d at 1162.
37
574 F.2d at 1162.
38
See supra notes 10 to 16 and accompanying text.
32
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upon an admittedly severe hearing handicap of the applicant, where it was shown
that the handicap could interfere with the applicant's ability to provide safe patient
care both as a student nurse and as a potential Registered Nurse.
2. Whether Section 504 of this Act impliedly imposes upon colleges and
universities an affirmative obligation to provide affirmative and expensive
accommodation for the seriously handicapped who seek admission to programs
designed to train and educate them for professional employment involving a high
degree of physical and mental dexterity. 39
Arguing on behalf of Southeastern, Professor Eugene Gressman cemented this framing of the
legal issues. During the oral argument, he referred frequently to the trial court’s determination
that Davis “could not effectively complete the training program because of her handicap.” 40
Gressman also stated stereotyped characterizations of people with hearing impairments that they
could not perform safely in many arenas. 41 Furthermore, Gressman left open the suggestion of an
apparently sympathetic Justice that because § 504 did not authorize affirmative action, unlike
several other sections of the Rehab Act, the regulation requiring auxiliary aids and services
might have outstripped the agency’s authority. 42 In so doing, he used the phrase “affirmative
accommodation,” a phrase in the language of affirmative action, rather than the auxiliary aids
and services that are specifically required in § 504. 43
Marc Charmatz, arguing in reply on behalf of the National Association for the Deaf, tried to
rescue the facts about Davis’ qualifications, but could only state to the Court: “We have also
demonstrated in amici briefs that there are a number of areas where hearing impaired and
handicapped citizens perform safely and effectively in the medical community, functioning in
hospitals as hearing impaired people.” 44 To this, a questioning Justice responded: “I thought the
place you usually demonstrate something in a lawsuit is in the record before the trial court.” 45
All Charmatz could offer was “[w]hat I meant to say was that it is obvious that hearing impaired
people can perform in hospital situations,” a reply that did not address Davis’ potential in the
circumstances she would encounter in the clinical training program or the College’s outright
refusal to provide her with auxiliary aids. 46

39

Br. for Pet’r, Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, No. 78-711, 1979 WL 199912 (U.S.) (Appellate Br.), at *3. Other
issues briefed included whether § 504 gives rise to an implied private right of action and whether, if so, there is a
requirement to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing suit.
40
Tr. of Oral Arg., Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, No. 78-711, 3, 4, 6, 10, 12 (Apr. 23, 1979),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/pdfs/transcripts/1978/78-711_04-23-1979.pdf.
41
Id. at 18. (“Now, we have in this situation a reflection of this concern by the District Court for the safety
of the patients, and I think that a person who is unqualified to provide safe nursing care for the great mass of
individuals who are ill and sick raises a serious question as to whether this 504 duty should be imposed
indiscriminately upon that kind of program or activity.”).
42
Id. at 16.
43
Id. (“But Your Honor is exactly right, there is not one word on the face of 504 that establishes any duty
to make affirmative accommodation.”).
44
Id. at 27.
45
Id.
46
Tr. of Oral Arg., Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, No. 78-711, 27 (Apr. 23, 1979),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/pdfs/transcripts/1978/78-711_04-23-1979.pdf.
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When pressed further on Davis’ burden at the trial court, Charmatz conflated accommodation
with modification: “the problem was that the college refused to make any modification.” 47 He
contended that § 504 reflected Congress’s intent “that special education must be paid to the
needs of those individuals who through no fault of their own have not received adequate
education.” 48 This contention would turn Davis’ claim into a claim for remedial education, a
claim she was not making, but courted the linkages to affirmative action drawn by the Court.
Shortly thereafter in the argument, Charmatz retrieved the theme of accommodation. In response
to whether he challenged the findings of the district court, he indicated instead that the trial court
had asked the wrong question. The proper question, he said, should have been an
accommodation 49—which indeed it should have been, on the analysis presented here. But
because Davis’ capabilities with auxiliary aids and services had not been sufficiently explored at
the trial court, Charmatz was forced to rely on the unsatisfactory general conclusion “that a
college in this instance was blind to the ability of handicapped people to perform, such as Ms.
Davis, and to contribute meaningfully to society.” 50
The Court ruled unanimously in favor of the College, taking the College’s claims about
Davis’ abilities to be uncontested. The Court’s analysis agreed with the College that the physical
standards it demanded were necessary for participation in its nursing program:
It is not open to dispute that, as Southeastern’s associate Degree Nursing program
currently is constituted, the ability to understand speech without reliance on lipreading is necessary for patient safety during the clinical phase of the program
[and] this ability also is indispensable for many of the functions that a registered
nurse performs. 51
In one sense, the statements the Court made here are true: because of the litigation strategy at
the district court, the College’s claims about the need to understand speech for patient safety and
the functions of a registered nurse were undisputed. But much more should have been said at the
trial court and was said too late in amicus briefs to the Court, 52 about the inaccurately
stereotyping assumptions in the College’s position about the availability of aids and possibilities
for safe participation in most if not all aspects of the clinical program.
47

Id. at 29.
Id. at 31.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 39. Later in the oral argument, a Justice observed, “[a]sked the wrong question, but you didn’t tell
it to ask any other questions, that is my problem.” Id. at 42.
51
Davis, 442 U.S. at 407.
52
Br. for Resp’t, Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, No. 78-711, 1979 WL 213503 (U.S.) (Appellate Br.) at *11
(“The College's erroneous assumption that a hearing-impaired person cannot safely and effectively complete the
educational requirements to become a registered nurse is contradicted by the very existence of many hearingimpaired persons safely and effectively performing in society every day as nurses, dentists and doctors.”). See also
Br. of Amicus Curiae of the State of Cal. in Supp. of the Resp’t, Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, No. 78-711, 1979 WL
213508 (U.S.) (Appellate Br.) at *8 (“The trial court found that the single major factor in the College's refusal to
allow admission to Davis was ‘their feelings that she would be unable to serve as a Registered Nurse’ . . It should be
noted in passing that their feelings do not appear to be founded on objective data or even a fair evaluation of Ms.
Davis' potential to function as a Registered Nurse.”)
48
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Next, the Court turned to the appellate court’s instructions on remand about auxiliary aids. In
a particularly damaging and unwarranted twist of language, the Court construed Davis as
requesting “affirmative action” rather than relief in the form of action to be taken by the College:
“[r]espondent contends nevertheless that § 504, properly interpreted, compels Southeastern to
undertake affirmative action that would dispense with the need for effective oral
communication.” 53 However, this analysis misconstrued Davis’ position. Davis had disavowed
any specific form of affirmative relief, noting, “this issue is not properly before this Court.” 54
Davis’ position before the Court was instead that, assuming arguendo that the appellate court’s
instructions to the trial court on remand were to be considered, the instructions were correct. 55
The trial court should give close attention on remand to affirmative relief in light of the Rehab
Act regulations and the College’s refusal to consider any auxiliary aids for Davis’ hearing
impairment. 56 Moreover, the dispute was about what affirmative relief would be appropriate, not
a request for “affirmative action.” 57 Unfortunately, the Court was never disabused of the
connection to affirmative action because Davis’ counsel stated in oral arguments that the College
had refused modifications. 58 Construing Davis as requesting affirmative action, the Court
claimed that allowing Davis to modify the nursing program to eliminate the clinical phase would
be a “fundamental alteration in the nature” of the program—in the Court’s judgment “far more
than the ‘modification’ regulation requires.” 59 Requiring the kind of close personal attention
Davis would need to participate safely in the care of patients, the Court said, is more than an
“auxiliary aid”; it is “affirmative action” in the form of services of a personal nature excluded by
the regulation. 60
This reasoning in Davis misconstrued both modifications and accommodations and confused
affirmative relief with affirmative action. On this reasoning, modifications could only be the
fundamental alteration in the program of excusing Davis from clinical training. Similarly,
accommodations could only be requests for unjustified special treatment, “affirmative action”
that would exceed “the evenhanded treatment of qualified handicapped persons and affirmative
efforts to overcome the disabilities caused by handicaps” 61 that Congress intended in the Rehab
Act. 62
53

Davis, 442 U.S. at 407.
Br. for Resp’t, Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, No. 78-711, 1979 WL 213503 (U.S.) (Appellate Br.) at *33.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
The only time the phrase “affirmative action” appears in the brief filed for Davis before the Supreme
Court is in a quotation from the Senate Report accompanying the 1974 amendments to § 504: “Where applicable,
Section 504 is intended to include a requirement of affirmative action as well as a prohibition of discrimination.” Br.
for Resp’t, Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, No. 78-711, 1979 WL 213503 (U.S.) (Appellate Br.) at *34.
58
Tr. of Oral Arg., supra note 39, at 44.
59
Davis, 442 U.S. at 410.
60
Id. at 409.
61
Id. at 410. In this reasoning, the Court cited sections of the Rehab Act other than § 504 where Congress
made an explicit reference to affirmative action. Moreover, Congress had only “encouraged” state agencies, in
contrast to the requirements it had imposed on the federal government. For another case sounding the theme that the
Rehab Act is not a requirement for affirmative efforts to overcome disadvantage, see Wimberly v. Labor and Indust.
Relations Comm’n of Mo., 479 U.S. 511, 517-18 (1987).
62
The Court thus reached the conclusions it did by confusing accommodations and modifications, and
Davis’ legacy rejecting “affirmative action” continues to this day. Had Davis arisen after 1990, Title II of the ADA
54
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III.

ALEXANDER V. CHOATE: THE PROBLEMS COMPOUND

This legacy of Davis confusing modifications and accommodations, and mischaracterizing
the latter as affirmative action, was entrenched several years later in a second Rehab Act
decision, Alexander v. Choate. 63 Choate is perhaps the most widely cited and influential decision
interpreting what modifications might be required for non-discrimination in public services
under the Rehab Act and, later, the ADA. 64
Choate involved Medicaid cutbacks and whether their impact on people with disabilities was
discriminatory. Beset by budgetary woes, the number of hospital days Tennessee would provide
annually to Medicaid recipients was reduced from twenty to fourteen. 65 People with disabilities
brought a class action suit contending that because the cutback had a differential impact on
them—more of whom required stays that would put them over the 14-day annual limit—it
violated the Rehab Act. 66 In an important victory for disability civil rights, the Choate Court
interpreted the Rehab Act to allow claims of disparate impact discrimination. 67 However, the
Court relied on Davis 68 in ruling that disparate impact must be kept “within manageable
bounds.” 69 The concept of “meaningful access” was introduced striking a balance between
reasonable modifications and fundamental alterations to delineate these bounds. 70 Subsequent
commentators have understood this balance in terms of a distinction between the benefit offered

would also have covered Southeastern as a state institution. The “fundamental alteration” language of the ADA,
however, appears in Title III rather than Title II, where the questions would have been what essential eligibility
requirements would be for the nursing program and whether Davis could meet them with or without auxiliary aids
and services. The idea of “affirmative action,” moreover, appears nowhere in Title II (or in Title III for that matter).
Yet as this article will demonstrate below, multiple decisions interpreting Title II of the ADA cite Davis to rely on
the fundamental alteration standard. Affirmative action is a subtheme in these cases as well. See e.g., A.H. by
Holzmueller v. Ill. High School Ass’n, 881 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2018).
63
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985). Although beyond the scope of this article, it is also
noteworthy that problematic choices were made in litigating the claims in Choate. The plaintiffs relied on statistical
evidence of differential impact rather than on evidence of actual cases in which people with disabilities were unable
to obtain access to hospital care on a par to the opportunities available to people without disabilities. It was thus
possible for the Court to say that despite the statistical differences people with disabilities had “meaningful access”
to the 14-day hospital benefit. See Leslie P. Francis & Anita Silvers, Debilitating Alexander v. Choate:
“Meaningful Access” to Health Care for People with Disabilities, 35 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 447 (2008).
64
In addition to Choate, the Court issued several other early and important Rehab Act decisions with
additional implications for the ADA. In Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986), the Court held that the
hospital had not discriminated when it followed the wishes of the parent who wished to decline treatment for a
newborn with disabilities. In Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty., Fl. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), the Court held that a
person with an infectious disease (tuberculosis) could be a person with disabilities under the Rehab Act.
Additionally, in Trayner v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 536 (1988), the Court held that the Veterans' Administration
definition of "willful misconduct" to include primary alcoholism for purposes of extending educational assistance
benefits did not violate the Rehab Act.
65
Choate, 469 U.S. at 287.
66
Id. at 290.
67
Id. at 299.
68
Id. at 300.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 301 (“The balance struck in Davis requires that an otherwise qualified handicapped individual
must be provided with meaningful access to the benefit that the grantee offers.)."
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and the access to it. 71 Although beyond the scope of this article, I have argued elsewhere with the
late Anita Silvers that this understanding is mistaken 72 and that a number of courts have
scrutinized the adequacy of the benefit at part of the meaningful access inquiry. 73
Like the Court in Davis, the Choate Court criticized the claims made on behalf of the
disabled as unwarranted affirmative action. 74 The Court put forth this characterization despite
recognizing that the Davis Court had been sharply criticized for its confusion of “affirmative
action” and “affirmative relief.” 75 Instead, the Choate Court defended its continuing use of
“affirmative action” as appropriate for claims that were judged to demand “fundamental
alterations” in programs. 76 To reject the contention that, under the fourteen day benefit rule,
people with disabilities would disproportionately lack meaningful access to healthcare, the Court
construed their request for structuring the health care benefit for each disabled individual to
“guarantee that each recipient will receive that level of health care precisely tailored to his or her
particular needs.” 77 Supporting the request would have entailed, in the judgment of the Court,
agreeing that health care needs of the disabled are “more important than others and more worthy
of cure through government subsidization.” 78 Here, the Court’s analysis can be viewed as seeing
the Choate litigants’ request as personal privileging, similar to Davis’ requests for auxiliary aids
as a request for personal services. If this point is stated in terms of the distinction between
accommodation and modification, the Court here understands the Choate litigants as requesting
accommodations for their individualized health care needs.
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This view was developed by SAMUEL BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY
RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 69-72 (2009).
72
Leslie Francis & Anita Silvers, Reading Alexander v. Choate Rightly: Now is the Time, 6 LAWS 17
(2017).
73
See, e.g. Am. Council of the Blind v. Paulson, 525 F.3d 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (failure to design
currency readily distinguishable to visually impaired violated ADA); Fisher v. Okla. Health Care Auth., 335 F.3d
1175 (10th Cir. 2003) (question of fact whether state’s decision to provide medically necessary prescription benefits
only to Medicaid beneficiaries residing in institutions but not to beneficiaries receiving community based services
violation of ADA); Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1994) (ADA violation to require receipt of attendant
care services in a nursing home, when the recipient was capable of living at home and wished to do so).
74
Choate, 469 U.S. at 303-04. This framing was pressed by the state in oral argument. Tr. of Oral Arg. in
Alexander v. Choate at 4, https://www.supremecourt.gov/pdfs/transcripts/1984/83-727_10-01-1984.pdf. It was also
pressed by the Solicitor General arguing for the federal government in support of the state: “the court of appeals’
theory of discrimination simply dissolves all possible distinctions between nondiscrimination on the one hand and a
major affirmative action program to aid the handicapped on the other.” Id. at 13. Notably, the Solicitor General also
characterized the goal of the Medicaid program as “not the satisfaction of health needs, but the provision of a given
level of health services.” Id. at 12-13.
75
469 U.S. at 300 n. 20.
76
Choate, 469 U.S. at 300-01. The analysis here argues that the Choate Court re-introduced the
confusions in concluding that the litigants were demanding individualized adjustments that required fundamental
program alterations. However, note 20 has been used by some later courts to recognize the importance of the
distinction between affirmative relief and affirmative action. E.g., A.P. ex rel. Peterson v. Anoka-Hennepin Indep.
Sch. Dist. No. 11, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (D. Minn. 2008).
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Id. at 303.
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Id. at 303-304.
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However, the Choate litigants’ contention was that Tennessee should make reasonable
modifications to its Medicaid cutbacks to allow equitable access to the Medicaid benefit. 79 Here,
the litigants can be seen as couching the Medicaid benefit differently from the state: as providing
medical assistance to eligible recipients within practical limits, not as providing whatever benefit
the state stipulates in the same way for everyone. The Choate litigants asserted that funding
under the Medicaid statute enables “each State, as far as practicable under the conditions in such
State, to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of families with dependent children and of
aged, blind or disabled individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs
of necessary medical services…”. 80 The litigants recognized that cutbacks in the program might
be necessary; however, their concern was for the cutbacks not to be structured in “a manner
which disproportionately imposes upon the handicapped or any other protected group a
grossly—in this case grossly disproportionate burden of bearing the brunt of that cutback.” 81
G. Gordon Bonnyman, Jr., arguing on behalf of the disabled, was placed in the difficult
position of trying to explain exactly what number of days in the hospital would be permissible
under questioning that assumed the state could choose which benefit to provide. 82 Bonnyman
tried to reframe the question in terms of a fair share of the burdens of the cutback 83 and the
regulatory requirement that the state may not administer Medicaid in a way that has “the effect of
substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the recipients program with respect
to handicapped persons.” 84 However, he was never able to satisfy the questioning Justices that
his position did not require equal results rather than an equal opportunity to enjoy the benefits of
the Medicaid program. Even Bonnyman unsuccessfully used the language of accommodations in
his argument, trying to distinguish Choate from Davis by contending that alternatives were
available to the state that would not have been as burdensome to the disabled. 85
To be sure, specifying the requirements for meaningful access is difficult. 86 On the one hand,
“meaningful” access cannot mean no access, as would be the case if a person with disabilities
who had exhausted her hospital days required an additional hospitalization in the same year. On
the other hand, it cannot mean adjustments that give the optimal result to everyone, as this would
require expenditures that the financially-strapped state could not sustain. In advocating for the
disabled, Bonnyman tried to convince the Court to see that answers were not to be found in
specifying a number of days that would comply with the Medicaid program. 87 Rather, the trial
court on remand should consider whether there were feasible alternatives for the financiallystrapped state that would not have required the disabled to bear an unfair share of the burden of
retrenchment. 88 Framing modifications as individually tailored accommodations, however,
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

Id. at 291.
42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2019).
Tr. of Oral Arg. in Alexander v. Choate, supra note 71, at 16.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 38
Id. at 43.
Mary Crossley, Giving Meaning to “Meaningful Access” in Medicaid Managed Care, 102 KY. L.J. 1

(2014).
87
88

Tr. of Oral Argument in Alexander v. Choate supra note 71, at 38.
Id. at 31.
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obscured this view of what non-discrimination required, because it individualized what should be
seen as a question of policy.

IV.

ACCOMMODATION AND MODIFICATION: THE LANGUAGE AND STRUCTURE OF THE ADA

The ADA, enacted in 1990, extended the Rehab Act beyond the federal government to
employers, public services, public accommodations, transportation, and communication. It did
not, however, alter the basic approach established by the Rehab Act and the regulations
promulgated to implement it.
A.

The ADA

The three major sections of the ADA addressing employment discrimination, public services,
and public accommodations use different language and structures for delineating nondiscrimination. Plaintiffs claiming that failure to accommodate is employment discrimination
must sue their employers under ADA Title I and meet that section’s requirements, even if their
employer is a public entity covered by Title II for the services it provides or a public
accommodation covered by Title III. The term for adjustments required by Title I is
“accommodation” and the term for adjustments required by Titles II and III is “modification.”
There are other differences among the titles as well; all are outlined in the remainder of this
subsection.
Title I of the ADA provides it is employment discrimination to “not mak[e] reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual
with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate
that the accommodation would impose undue hardship on the operation of the business of such
covered entity…” 89 Title I further defines “reasonable accommodation”:
The term ‘reasonable accommodation’ may include: (A) making existing facilities
used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with
disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or
devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training
materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other
similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities… 90
Several additional features of Title I are important for delineating the structural differences
among the titles. First, Title I gives a non-exclusive list of accommodations that may be required.
This list includes making facilities used by employees accessible to individuals with disabilities,

89
90

42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2018).
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2018).
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including break rooms, rest rooms, or workstations. 91 The list also includes changes in job
requirements, schedules, or assignments, if with these changes the individual can perform the
essential functions of the position 92: for example, limiting lifting for an employee with a back
injury, allowing an employee to work four rather than five shifts a week, or transferring an
employee to a vacant position. 93 In addition, the list includes equipment, training, or readers or
interpreters for employees who require them for communication. 94 Second, Title I only requires
accommodations for employees who can demonstrate that they can perform the essential
functions of the position with or without accommodations. 95 Third, Title I requires
accommodations when the physical or mental limitations are “known” to the employer; the
burden is on the employee to make known the need for accommodations. 96 Finally, undue
hardship is a defense available to the employer. 97 Hardships are measured by the overall
resources of the employer, among other factors. 98 Employers are especially likely to succeed in
this defense when the requested accommodations would place burdens on other employees. 99
Title II of the ADA applies to discrimination in public services. It provides: “no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in
or be denied the benefits of services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity…” 100 In this section of the ADA, “[q]ualified individual with a
disability” is defined as:
[A]n individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to
rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or
transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the
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Lee-Thomas v. Prince George's Cty. Pub. Sch., 2017 WL 2733802 (D. Md. 2017) (ergonomic chair;
grab bars in rest rooms).
92
E.g., Singleton v. Pub. Health Trust of Miami-Dade Cty. (Jackson Mem’l Hosp.), 2017 WL 2712937
(S.D. Fla. 2017) (physician with ADD could not meet essential function of position to see a minimum number of
patients per day); Miller v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 1262 (D. Ore. 2016) (ability to walk
constantly for 4 hours not essential function of job of hub supervisor).
93
E.g., Harris v. Chao, 257 F. Supp. 3d 67 (D.D.C. 2017) (reasonable reassignment process required for
employee with hearing impairment after current job responsibilities shifted increasingly to conference calls in which
it was difficult for the employee to participate).
94
Searls v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 158 F. Supp. 3d 427 (D. Md. 2016) (ALS interpreter for deaf nurse).
95
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2018).
96
Stockton v. Christus Health Se. Tex., 2017 WL 1287550 (E.D. Tex. 2017) (employee has responsibility
to inform employer of need for an accommodation).
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42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2018).
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See Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html#undue (last visited Dec. 1,
2019).
99
E.g., U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 39 (2002) (reassignment to light duty position for employee
with back injury not reasonable when seniority system assigns position to someone else); Farha v. Cogent
Healthcare of Mich., 164 F. Supp. 3d 974 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (night rotations essential function of hospitalist
position).
100
42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2018).
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essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in
programs or activities provided by the public entity. 101
Here, instead of “accommodation,” Title II uses the term “modification.” Further explanation
of the meaning of “modification” is provided by reference to “rules, policies, or practices, the
removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary
aids and services…”. 102 Modification is built into the definition of a qualified plaintiff as
someone who with or without modifications can meet essential eligibility requirements. 103 Use
of the term “modification” here would suggest that these are changes that might apply to others
who are similarly situated; changes in rules, policies, or practices are not individualized. Title II,
however, does not entirely ignore accommodations; they appear in the form of “auxiliary aids
and services” that individuals might need for participation in or to benefit from public services,
programs, or activities. Moreover, the legislative history indicates Congress intended the forms
of discrimination prohibited by Title I and Title III also apply to Title II. 104 Notably, Title II does
not state the counterparts to the Title I defense of undue hardship or the requirement that the
plaintiff make his or her disability known before modifications might be required.
Title III, the public accommodations section of the ADA, presents still further differences in
language and structure. Its basic provision reads: “No individual shall be discriminated against
on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation . . .” 105 “Full
and equal enjoyment” is robust language—more robust language than the “exclusion or denial”
language of Title II. Title III further specifies several ways in which this non-discrimination
mandate is to be constructed. It is discrimination to deny the opportunity to participate in a
benefit, to afford the opportunity to participate in a benefit that is “not equal to that afforded to
other[s],” or to provide separate benefits unless necessary for the benefits to be equally effective
as those provided to others. 106 Title III also specifies that the “goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, and accommodations shall be afforded to an individual with a disability
in the most integrated setting appropriate.” 107 Even when there are separate programs, “an
individual with a disability shall not be denied the opportunity to participate in such programs or
activities that are not separate or different.” 108 Specific prohibitions include:
101

42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2018).
Id.
103
E.g., Halpern v. Wake Forest University Health Sciences, 669 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2012) (medical student
with ADHD had frequent lapses of professionalism and thus could not show he met essential eligibility
requirements).
104
Washington v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 181 F.3d 840, 848 (7th Cir. 1999), quoting H.R.
Rep No. 485(II), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1990): “The Committee has chosen not to list all the types of actions that
are included within the term “discrimination,” as was done in titles I and III, because [Title II] essentially simply
extends the anti-discrimination prohibition embodied in section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] to all actions of state
and local governments. The Committee intends, however, that the forms of discrimination prohibited by [Title II] be
identical to those set out in the applicable provisions of titles I and III of this proposed legislation.”
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42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2018).
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42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i), (ii), (iii) (2018).
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42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(B) (2018).
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42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(C) (2018).
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failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures,
when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless
the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally
alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations… 109
That a modification would be a “fundamental alteration” of what the public accommodation
provides is thus a defense. For example, it is a “fundamental alteration” of a board certification
examination for a physician to request that it be open book or essay format 110 but not to extend
the deadline required to pass a qualifying exam in order to allow time for therapy or
rehabilitation of the candidate to become effective. 111 An additional undue burden defense is
allowed, but only to the requirement for a public accommodation to provide auxiliary aids and
services. 112 Removal of architectural and structural communication barriers is required only if
“readily achievable.” 113
B.

The Emergence of the ADA from the Rehab Act

Legislative proposals that ultimately became the ADA were directly modeled on the Rehab
Act, with a single overarching prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability. The initial
proposal, from the National Council on the Handicapped, would have prohibited discrimination
in employment, housing, public accommodations, as defined in the Civil Rights Act,
transportation, state agencies or subdivisions, or broadcasts or other telecommunications. 114 Fair
housing was removed from this bill and became the Fair Housing Amendments of 1988. 115 In
1989, work on what became the ADA began in earnest. 116 This started with H.R. 2273, also
structured with an overarching prohibition of disability discrimination, but with more specific
provisions governing employment, public services, and public accommodations. 117 Among the
miscellaneous provisions of H.R. 2273 was that its different titles should be construed as
consistent with one another and that any apparent conflict should be resolved “by reference to
the title that specifically covers the type of action in question,” an initial recognition of
differences among the arenas in which discrimination was to be prohibited. 118
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H.R. 2273 in the form in which it was introduced generated significant opposition from the
business community. 119 In the summer of 1989, a compromise was negotiated that gained the
support of the Bush administration and was enacted by the Senate as S. 933 120 in the form that
ultimately became the ADA. S. 933 eliminated the overarching prohibition on disability
discrimination in favor of the separate and substantively different titles governing employment,
public services, and public accommodations. Among the most important changes were the
elimination of a “most integrated setting” requirement and an equal participation or benefit
requirement from the employment discrimination title; these remained, in somewhat altered
form, in the public accommodation title.121 Another was that a “small business exception”
remained for employment discrimination—employers were not to be covered unless they had at
least 15 full-time equivalent employees. 122 By contrast, the needs of smaller businesses
providing public accommodations were met by a variety of more specific requirements such as
that the removal of barriers should be “readily achievable” 123 or that the provision of auxiliary
aids and services should not be an “undue burden.” 124
This legislative history reveals policy reasons that shaped how the titles were differentiated.
Because employers ultimately bear the costs of adjustment for disability, whatever these costs
turn out to be, employers were protected from excess costs through the undue hardship
defense. 125 Smaller employers were exempted altogether. 126 The employment discrimination title
of the ADA, Title I, allowed employers to set job qualifications (as long as they are
nondiscriminatory), to protect themselves against employee misconduct, and to have an undue
hardship defense for excessive costs. 127 To protect employees from intrusive inquiries, it may
also seem reasonable to put the burden on the person with a disability to request any needed
accommodations. 128 The debates in Congress about Title I paid particular attention to employers’
concerns about testing employees for substance abuse and safety risks. 129 Congress was also
explicit that employers should not be able to act on stereotypes such as fears of HIV. 130 Finally,
employers are hiring individuals for jobs; anti-discrimination requires that capable individuals
not be excluded from employment by the failure to make adjustments that would enable them to
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perform successfully, and so can reasonably be conceptualized in terms of individual
accommodations. 131
Public services arguably are different. One primary theme in Congress about public services
was the inequity that many of these services were covered by the Rehabilitation Act through
receipt of federal funding, while others, especially in rural areas, were not. 132 Much of the more
substantive discussion of public services attended to specific provisions for transportation and
telecommunications, where costs or feared cutbacks in service were an issue. 133 The legislative
history contains no explanation of why “modification” is the chosen term in contrast to
“accommodation” and is in my judgment surprisingly minimal about the general nondiscrimination provision in Title II overall. Congress did state explicitly that interpretation of
Title II was meant to follow the Rehabilitation Act as interpreted in Alexander v. Choate. 134
Congressional reports also stated that the prohibitions in Title II were intended to parallel those
in Titles I and III, without saying more in light of the differences between these titles. 135 The
House report does explain that the non-specificity of the Title II anti-discrimination provision
was deliberate, again without more about how to flesh out the parallels with the other titles:
The Committee has chosen not to list all the types of actions that are included
within the term “discrimination,” as was done in titles I and III, because this title
essentially simply extends the anti-discrimination prohibition embodied in section
504 to all actions of state and local governments. The Committee intends,
however, that the forms of discrimination prohibited by section 202 be identical to
those set out in the applicable provisions of titles I and III of this legislation.
Thus, for example, the construction of “discrimination” set forth in section 102(b)
and (c) and section 302 (b), should be incorporated in the regulations
implementing this title. 136
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H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 338 (1990) (“The Committee believes that the reasonable accommodation
requirement is best understood as a process in which barriers to a particular individual's equal employment
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S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 142 (1990) (“It is the Committee's intent that section 202 and other sections of
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H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 357 (1990). The Report then notes that any additional requirements of the
Rehabilitation Act should also be included in the implementation of Title II.
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Congress said nothing more about what this incorporation might mean or whether, when the
sections differ, the employment title or the public accommodations title is the appropriate model
to use.
Public accommodations are different still. The House Report indicates that the purpose of
public accommodations “is to bring individuals with disabilities into the economic and social
mainstream of American life . . . in a clear, balanced, and reasonable manner.” 137 The legislative
history details the importance of access to public accommodations for addressing the devastating
social isolation experienced by people with disabilities. 138 To the extent possible, people should
be able to enjoy them together; this means, for example, that restaurants and places of
entertainment should be structured to allow people with disabilities to enjoy them with their
families or friends. 139 Unlike the small employer exemption, there is no exemption for small
businesses providing public accommodations. 140 Providers of public accommodations can decide
what they want to provide—they are not required to fundamentally alter their products and may
impose legitimate safety protections—but they may not effectively close off their offerings to
people with disabilities based on stereotypes about their capabilities. 141 This “fundamental
alteration” defense is not the same as an undue hardship defense, however; it is a defense that
permits the public accommodation to choose the kind of service that it is providing. The Title III
undue burden defense—unlike the defense available to employers under Title I—applies only to
the provision of auxiliary aids and services. 142 In addition, Congress made a variety of carefully
fashioned concessions to smaller businesses or businesses in existing facilities that would be
difficult to alter. These concessions include that barriers must be removed only as readily
achievable; in new construction, by contrast, access must be provided to the maximum feasible
extent. 143
Although these three different ADA sections—for employment, public services, and public
accommodations—are detached from the mooring of the Rehab Act in the receipt of federal
funding that allows for a single standard to apply to multiple domains, they preserved the
distinctions among the areas that had been developed in the Rehab Act regulations. Congress’
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goal was harmony, not conflict, between the Rehab Act and the ADA. 144 This did not, however,
mean the same standard for each domain. While it surely would be problematic for Rehab Act
standards and ADA standards for employment to be out of harmony, or for Rehab Act and ADA
standards for public services to be out of harmony, or for Rehab Act and ADA standards for
public accommodations to be out of harmony, it does not follow as a matter of logic that the
standards for employment, public services, and public accommodations should be the same.
Indeed, pre-ADA Rehab Act cases recognized that public services and public accommodations
may raise different problems for anti-discrimination law. 145 And the statute that became the
ADA changed from the form in which it was originally introduced 146 to the creation of separate
titles for employment, public services, and public accommodations.
V.

CONFUSIONS IN THE ADA CASE LAW

This section describes selected aspects of the continuing impact of Davis on ADA case law.
Quantitative analysis of the case law is difficult, however, for several reasons. First, Davis is
frequently cited for the issue on which it was litigated at the trial court: that qualifications must
be addressed in spite of, rather than apart from, disability. These citations do not implicate the
confusions identified in this article. Second, ADA plaintiffs often lose on summary judgment on
issues other than accommodation or modification claims. This was especially true in the years
following enactment of the ADA, when the U.S. Supreme Court significantly tightened the
interpretation of “disability” 147 to the extent that people were not considered disabled unless
they were significantly restricted in performing tasks central to the daily lives of most people. 148
The majority of complaints of disability discrimination were resolved on motions to dismiss or
motions for summary judgment by courts concluding that plaintiffs could not demonstrate that
they were sufficiently disabled to claim the protections of the statute. This high dismissal rate
complicates analysis of the case law on other issues, although some cases granting these motions
on the determination of disability status also provided alternative analyses on which plaintiff’s
claim also failed. Third, the influence of Davis reaches beyond cases directly citing that decision.
For example, in the Fifth Circuit, a much-cited case 149 relies on an earlier decision citing Davis
for analyzing an accommodation request in terms of whether it would be a modification
amounting to a fundamental alteration in the employee’s job. 150
Described in what follows are the impact of Davis in two types of cases, one involving
employment discrimination claims and the other involving claims of discrimination in public
services or accommodations. First, on the analysis presented below, there are employment
discrimination cases in which the court shifts the frame from an accommodation analysis—
where the defense would be undue hardship—to a modification analysis where the employer
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claims a fundamental alteration. Second are cases involving high school athletes, some of which
appropriately distinguish whether the request is for an accommodation or for a modification and
others of which do not. These cases were selected because they are particularly good illustrations
of how blurring accommodation and modification can lead courts to reject claims as preferential
treatment rather than as non-discrimination.
A.

Employment: Transfers and New Positions

When people with disabilities are unable to perform certain duties of their current jobs,
potential strategies are to seek changes in their existing job responsibilities or transfers to
different positions. These changes may be critical to the ability of some employees to continue
working. Frequent examples are employees whose jobs involve some heavy lifting but who are
given permanent weight restrictions after an on-the-job injury. 151 Courts divide on the analytic
framework they apply to these requests and, correspondingly, on whether they understand these
requests as reasonable accommodations. On the one hand, some courts cite Davis or other
holdings that the ADA is not an “affirmative action” statute to conclude that the only required
accommodation is to allow disabled employees seeking reassignment to compete on the same
terms with other applicants for positions. 152 Other courts apply the framework delineated in Title
I for reasonable accommodations, turning on the qualifications analysis of whether the employee
could perform the position with the accommodation and the hardship analysis of whether the
accommodation would impose undue costs on the employer in light of its resources. 153 An outer
constraint is the Supreme Court’s holding that it is an undue hardship to override rules of
seniority systems that establish expectations for other employees, absent a showing of special
circumstances. 154 The discussion that follows traces the influence of Davis in the federal
appellate courts with the lowest percentages of plaintiffs surviving motions for summary
judgment on disability accommodation issues, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. 155
Fifth Circuit. A leading Rehabilitation Act decision in the Fifth Circuit involved a building
inspector with Parkinson’s disease who had difficulties with balance and had fallen at inspection
sites. 156 The city determined, on medical recommendations, that allowing him to continue
performing on-site inspections posed a safety risk to him. 157 He requested office-only duties as
151
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an accommodation. 158 In ruling for the employer, the court cited Davis both for assessing the
employee’s qualifications in light of his disabilities and for rejecting accommodation requests
that are fundamental alterations. 159 The court, did, however, apply the Title I analysis of whether
the employee was qualified and whether the accommodations he requested would be an undue
hardship for the employer. 160 Later Fifth Circuit cases have recited the undue hardship analysis
to conclude that because the ADA is not an “affirmative action” statute, all that is required for
reassignment requests is to treat the employee with disabilities in the same way as all others. 161
In an influential decision cited by other circuits, 162 the Court wrote: “…we do not read the ADA
as requiring affirmative action in favor of individuals with disabilities, in the sense of requiring
that disabled persons be given priority in hiring or reassignment over those who are not disabled.
It prohibits employment discrimination against qualified individuals, no more and no less.” 163
Eleventh Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit has followed the lead of the Fifth Circuit in regarding
the accommodation requirement as only requiring the same treatment given non-disabled
employees. For example, in a case involving an airline reservation sales agent who developed
carpal tunnel syndrome and had difficulty typing constantly, US Air originally allowed her to
reduce her hours and gave her medical leave for her surgery. 164 When she returned to work,
however, she was not allowed to work part time and encountered a delay of as much as three
months in accessing the drop keyboard accommodation she had requested. 165 The Eleventh
Circuit held, as a matter of law, that a request for a part time schedule when the employer does
not have part time openings cannot be a reasonable accommodation. 166 The court reached that
conclusion by relying on the Fifth Circuit’s view that the ADA is not an affirmative action
statute: “the ADA was never intended to turn nondiscrimination into discrimination.”
B.

Public Services or Public Accommodations: High School Athletics

Cases brought by aspiring high school athletes claiming disability discrimination are another
area in which the confusions introduced by Davis are particularly apparent. Claims in these cases
are typically brought under the Rehab Act against school systems that receive federal funding,
against public schools under ADA Title II, and against non-profit state high school athletics
associations under ADA Title III. Some of the claims are for individualized accommodations and
recognized as such by litigants, schools, and the courts. Examples include altered starting blocks
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for a track athlete with cerebral palsy, 167 sign interpretation or vibration rather than auditory
signals to indicate the start of play for deaf athletes, 168 insulin pumps and fanny packs for
diabetic supplies, and guides for the visually impaired. 169
Cases involving eligibility requirements, altered scoring systems, and changes in the
categories of competition, however, illustrate how the problematic legacy of Davis may play out
both for confusions of accommodation requests with modifications and with confusions of
modification requests with accommodations. For example, some students with disabilities may
take longer to complete school or need to stay out of school for lengthy periods of time. These
athletes confront eligibility limits such as the requirement that they be under 19, that they only
have eight semesters (or four years) of eligibility, or that they complete high school within a
specified number of years. When their efforts to seek waivers of the eligibility limits fail, they
may pursue claims of discrimination based on disability. Some courts reject these claims on the
ground that they do not involve discrimination “on the basis of” disability, but the imposition of
otherwise neutral eligibility rules. 170 This reasoning applies a “but for” approach to analyzing
causation under the ADA, an approach on which courts divide. 171 Courts also analyze whether
these requests are reasonable accommodations, reasonable modifications, or fundamental
alterations in high school sports programs and here is where the Davis confusions emerge. On
the analysis presented in this article, a request for a waiver is a request for an analysis of the
individual’s circumstances, addressing questions such as: was a disability the reason he or she
has been unable to complete high school within the requisite time period for athletic eligibility?
If the time or age limit were not imposed in this individual’s case, would it impose an undue
hardship or expense? Does the individual pose a safety risk, possibly because his or her body has
become far more mature than the bodies of other competitors? Are there fairness issues, such as
suggestions of redshirting or staying out of school to gain a competitive advantage?
The leading case in the area relied on Davis and treated an individualized waiver request as a
request for major modifications in the structure of athletic eligibility.172 Edward Pottgen repeated
two grades in elementary school because of an undiagnosed learning disability; after he was
tested and diagnosed, he progressed through school at a normal rate. 173 When he sought to play
high school baseball his senior year, he was ruled ineligible because he had turned nineteen the
summer before his senior year. 174 His request for a hardship waiver was denied and he claimed
that the denial was disability discrimination. In reversing the district court, and ruling against
Pottgen, the Eighth Circuit turned to Davis to agree with Missouri that age is an essential
eligibility requirement “of immense importance in any interscholastic sports program” because it
167
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reduces the competitive advantage to teams using older athletes, protects younger athletes from
harm, discourages student athletes from delaying their graduation to gain advantages, and
prevents coaches from repeatedly red-shirting athletes. 175 The court then concluded that the only
possible accommodation—waiving the age limit—would be unreasonable because it would
fundamentally alter the athletic program. 176 This analysis treats Pottgen’s request as a
modification, changing the eligibility rules of the game, just as the Davis Court treated her
request as for a change in the structure of the nursing program. While it might be true that
changing eligibility rules to allow waivers without the kind of individualized assessment relevant
to an accommodation determination would fundamentally alter the structure of high school
competition, it does not follow that individualized accommodation decisions would do so. This
accommodation analysis should have been considered by the Eighth Circuit but was not.
Some subsequent courts confronting waiver situations have followed the Eighth Circuit in
mistakenly treating them as modifications rather than accommodations. 177 Others have not,
however. For example, the Seventh Circuit upheld a waiver of the eight-semester rule for a
learning disabled student who had dropped out of high school for a period before his disability
was diagnosed, 178 specifically rejecting the Eighth Circuit’s modification analysis in favor of an
individualized assessment: “…the better view is to ask whether waiver of the rule in the
particular case at hand would be so at odds with the purposes behind the rule that it would be a
fundamental and unreasonable change.” 179
Cases also confuse modification requests with requests for accommodations, as in Choate.
For example, Aaron Holzmueller, a high school runner with cerebral palsy, sought to have a
division created for runners that applied the international Paralympic time standards to determine
whether runners’ times met the qualifications to participate in the state track meet. 180 Application
of these time standards would introduce a change in how times were calculated for participation
in state meets, a change that has been adopted by some high school athletic associations. 181 The
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application would not be an individualized assessment of a particular athlete; rather, it would
adopt the international standards. 182 The analytic framework for the court should have been
whether this change would fundamentally alter the nature of state track competition. Instead, the
court, citing Davis as an unjustified request for lowering standards and guaranteeing results,
considered whether introduction of the calculative method would “guarantee AH increased
participation and success” and “undermine the competitiveness of the State championship
meet.” 183
Other courts have confronted requests to introduce new competitive categories, such as a
wheelchair division, and considered whether these requests follow the procedures for
establishing new forms of competition or are fundamental alterations in high school athletics
programs. Katie Ladlie, for example, a para athlete in Missouri, sought to have adaptive events
introduced into state championships and points earned in these events counted towards school
totals. 184 She did not argue that her times could be comparatively adjusted by any established set
of standards, conceding that as a chair athlete she would have a disadvantage at shorter distances
and an advantage at longer ones. 185 On the analysis presented here, the sole question for the court
should have been whether the modifications she requested were reasonable. The court resolved
this question in favor of the athletic association, a determination based on the association’s claim
that it was working diligently to introduce adaptive sports. 186 However, the court also introduced
into this analysis as a reason for rejecting Ladlie’s claim that it would lower standards to
accommodate a person with disabilities.187 Here, while the court began, appropriately, with a
modification frame, it veered into an accommodation frame to dismiss Ladlie’s claim as
preferential treatment.
CONCLUSION
In drafting the ADA, Congress delineated analytic frames for accommodations and
modifications in a nuanced way for different arenas in which protection against disability
discrimination is important to human lives. Determining how a qualified individual can perform
a job, participate in or receive the benefit of public services, or enjoy public accommodations in
non-standard ways requires an individualized assessment of the individual’s capacities and
whether accommodations are reasonable or impose an undue hardship. General modifications in
policies or in the built environment—enjoyable by all—may also be needed to address
discrimination. The anti-discrimination mandate may become distorted, however, when requests
for individualized adjustments are taken as wholesale changes, or when modifications are seen as
individually targeted privilege. Davis and Choate, the most important early Rehab Act decisions,
set anti-discrimination law on a troubled path from which it has yet to fully return.

182

For the standards, see Classification in Para Athletics, WORLD PARA ATHLETICS,
https://www.paralympic.org/athletics/classification (last visited Oct. 8, 2019).
183
881 F.3d at 594.
184
K.L. v. Missouri State High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 178 F. Supp. 3d 792 (E.D. Mo 2016).
185
Id. at 794.
186
Id. at 795.
187
178 F. Supp. at 802.

207

